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Abstract
Many philosophers have argued that a hypothesis is better confirmed by
some data if the hypothesis was not specifically designed to fit the data.
‘Prediction’, they argue, is superior to ‘accommodation’. Others deny that
there is any epistemic advantage to prediction, and conclude that predic-
tion and accommodation are epistemically on a par. This paper argues
that there is a respect in which accommodation is superior to prediction.
Specifically, the information that the data was accommodated rather than
predicted suggests that the data is less likely to have been manipulated
or fabricated, which in turn increases the likelihood that the hypothesis
is correct in light of the data. In some cases, this epistemic advantage of
accommodation may even outweigh whatever epistemic advantage there
might be to prediction, making accommodation epistemically superior to
prediction all things considered.
Keywords: accommodation; prediction; uncertain evidence; data fraud.
1 Introduction
There are two ways for a piece of data to support a hypothesis. If the hypoth-
esis was designed to fit the data, we say that the hypothesis accommodates the
data. If the data fits the hypothesis despite not having been designed to do
so, we say that the hypothesis predicts the data. So the difference between ac-
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commodation and prediction comes down to a difference between whether the
hypothesis was already built to fit the data (accommodation), or whether this
fit between hypothesis and data was instead a happy discovery made after the
hypothesis had been constructed (prediction).
But what is the significance of this distinction for whether and how much
the data confirms the hypothesis? Philosophers of science have defended a
variety of answers to that question, ranging from the view that only pre-
dicted data could support a hypothesis (e.g. Giere, 1983, 1984) to the view that
there is no epistemic difference between prediction and accommodation (e.g.
Keynes, 1921; Howson, 1990). Between these extremes, there are a number
of more moderate and widely accepted views, here jointly labelled weak pre-
dictivism (e.g. Maher, 1988; Lange, 2001; White, 2003; Lipton, 2004; Barnes,
2009). According to these views, the information that a hypothesis predicts
rather than accommodates some data is, all other things being equal, symp-
tomatic of some epistemic feature that speaks in favor of the hypothesis. Thus
weak predictivists hold that the information that a hypothesis was predicted
is an indirect epistemic reason to place more confidence in the hypothesis
in so far as this suggests that some such epistemic feature is present in the
hypothesis-data pair.
The current paper argues for a form of what I call weak accommodation-
ism, viz. that the information that a hypothesis accommodates rather than
predicts some data is, all other things being equal, symptomatic of an epis-
temic feature that speaks in favor of the hypothesis. An outrageous claim,
to be sure, especially given the popularity and plausibility of its ‘converse’
thesis, weak predictivism. But as we shall see, this version of weak accommo-
dationism follows straightforwardly from plausible assumptions about confir-
mation, uncertainty, and motivations for data fraud. We shall also see that,
appearances perhaps to the contrary, weak accommodationism is not in fact
incompatible with weak predictivism, for there may be distinct advantages to
prediction that aren’t annulled or cancelled by the proposed advantage to ac-
commodation. This, I shall suggest, may partly explain why the accommoda-
tion/prediction distinction is generally not deemed as epistemically relevant
in science as weak predictivism suggests that it should be. In sum, then, it
2
will be argued that weak accommodationism is true, and furthermore not just
compatible with, but indeed complementary to, the ‘converse’ thesis of weak
predictivism.
As we shall see, this argument for weak accommodationism is not merely of
theoretical interest. The argument shows that the information that a hypoth-
esis accommodated rather than predicted some data provides an epistemic
advantage to the hypothesis via establishing reasons to believe in the integrity
of the relevant scientist(s). In this way, the argument of this paper goes against
a common sentiment among some philosophers of science according to which
scientists who design their hypotheses so as to accommodate existing data are
viewed with suspicion, even to the point of being compared to pseudoscien-
tists in the Popperian sense (Barnes, 2009, 240). Instead what emerges is a
picture on which prediction and accommodation provide different and com-
plementary epistemic advantages, so that an ideal scientific community would
plausibly consist in a mixture of ‘predictors’ and ‘accommodators’. This is es-
pecially so in sciences that are politically contested or charged, such as climate
science, since even the most ardent skeptics of such sciences cannot reason-
ably claim that the accommodated data has been manipulated or fabricated
in order to artificially support the relevant hypothesis. So, for example, the
practice of ‘tuning’ of climate models to accommodate available data sets (see,
e.g., Steele and Werndl, 2013; Frisch, 2015) is not just a perfectly legitimate
source of support for such models, but indeed offers an additional reason to
place one’s confidence in these models and the scientists who develop them.
2 Prediction and Predictivism
As I have indicated already, I will be using the terms ‘prediction’ and ‘accom-
modation’ to mark a distinction in whether a hypothesis supported by some
data was designed to fit the data. Thus hypothesis H predicts data D just in case
H fits D but H wasn’t designed to fit D; and conversely H accommodates D just
in case H fits D and H was designed to fit D. In this pair of definitions, I am
using the admittedly vague term ‘fits’ where others often use ‘entails’. I prefer
the former because a hypothesis will often predict or accommodate data even
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when the hypothesis doesn’t entail the data, as when the hypothesis is inher-
ently statistical and so will at best only assign a certain probability (less than
one) to the data.1 Assuming that you think that accommodation and predic-
tion both carry some evidential weight, you can replace ‘fits’ with ‘confirms’
or ‘supports’ in these definitions. On the other hand, if you think that ac-
commodation (or, alternatively, prediction) is evidentially irrelevant, then you
can instead replace ‘fits D’ with ‘would have confirmed H , if H had predicted
(accommodated) D’. In this way, ‘fits’ can be replaced without remainder by
other terms commonly used in philosophy of science; but I will continue to
use it here to simplify the discussion.2
The distinction between prediction and accommodation I am employing
here has become known as a heuristic distinction, since it concerns whether
the data D was used (as a heuristic) for designing the hypothesis H (see, e.g.,
Zahar, 1973; Worrall, 1978, 1985; Gardner, 1982). In the early literature on
prediction and accommodation, by contrast, it was common to employ a tem-
poral distinction between prediction and accommodation, where H was said
to predict D just in case D fits H and H had been constructed prior to obtain-
ing D — and H was said to accommodate D just in case D fits H and H had
not been constructed prior to obtaining D (see, e.g., Popper, 1963; Lakatos,
1970). With the benefit of hindsight, the heuristic distinction is clearly prefer-
able. After all, whatever epistemic benefits there are to prediction will also be
present in cases where D was obtained before constructing H but D played no
role whatsoever in the construction of H . For example, Einstein is often taken
to have predicted the precession of Mercury’s perihelion from the general the-
ory of relativity since Mercury’s perihelion seemingly played no role in the
1Another type of case in which it would at least be misleading to speak of ‘entailment’
between hypothesis and data is when the hypothesis only entails the data in conjunction with
auxiliary hypotheses whose epistemic status is also at least somewhat uncertain. After all,
any proposition entails any other proposition in conjunction with the right premises, but we
wouldn’t want to say that any proposition either ‘predicts’ or ‘accommodates’ any other.
2I will also simplify the discussion below by using the term ‘correct’ to refer to the feature
of scientific hypotheses for which predicted/accommodated data are meant provide support.
I do not intend for this to prejudge the issue of scientific realism versus anti-realism, so those
anti-realists who are suspicious of truth or its role in our understanding of evidential support
may interpret this term as referring to empirical adequacy or instrumental reliability, for ex-
ample, rather than truth or approximate truth.
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construction of Einstein’s theory — regardless of the fact that the precession
of Mercury’s perihelion was known well before Einstein’s theory. Other ways
of drawing the prediction/accommodation distinction have been proposed as
well (see, e.g., Barnes, 2009), but following most other recent discussions I will
be concerned with the heuristic distinction in what follows.
Predictivism is the general idea that predictions are epistemically superior
to accommodation in some way. An extreme form of predictivism, which can
rightly be called naive predictivism, holds that only predictions can serve to
confirm scientific hypotheses.3 On this view, accommodated data is confirma-
tionally irrelevant. Although naive predictivism seems to have been defended
in the past (Giere, 1983, 1984),4 these arguments have been shown to be falla-
cious (Howson, 1990; Collins, 1994). Furthermore, naive predictivism would
have truly absurd consequences, as the following case illustrates: Suppose H
predicted some data set D1, ...,Dn, which thus confirms it at some time t1; at
t2, H is then modified (never mind why) into another hypothesis H ∗ so as to
accommodate some additional data Dn+1 (which may conflict with H or sim-
ply lie outside of H ’s scope) while preserving the previous fit with D1, ...,Dn.5
According to naive predictivism, H ∗ could derive no support whatsoever from
Dn+1, nor could it derive any support from D1, ...,Dn. After all, H ∗ would have
been designed to fit both Dn+1 and D1, ...,Dn. So, according to naive predic-
tivism, H ∗ would enjoy no support whatsoever while the clearly less adequate
H would be considered strongly supported by D1, ...,Dn.
A somewhat more plausible form of predictivism is strong predictivism, which
holds that although accommodation and prediction can both confirm hypothe-
ses, “prediction is intrinsically superior to accommodation” (Barnes, 2018, §4).
I take this to entail that, if H predicted rather than accommodated D, then D
necessarily confirms H more strongly than it would have otherwise (all else
being equal). Strong predictivism is widely criticized in the literature (How-
3Barnes (2018) refers to this as ‘the null support thesis’.
4This view is also frequently attributed to Popper (1959), although Popper famously es-
chews the very idea of inductive confirmation and instead refers to hypotheses that are sup-
ported by predictions as ‘corroborated’.
5This is of course a very common type of event in the development of science.
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son, 1990; Achinstein, 1994; Barnes, 2005b, 2009; Harker, 2006, 2008). The
strongest consideration against it may simply be that it places a rather mysteri-
ous epistemic significance on how a hypothesis came into existence. Appealing
to the genesis of a hypothesis in determining its epistemic status in this way
would apparently require us to look beyond any extant account of epistemic
justification or evidential support. After all, current theories of epistemic jus-
tification typically hold that an empirical proposition is ultimately supported
by perceptual foundations (foundationalism), or else logical, probabilistic or
explanatory coherence (coherentism); neither of which includes facts about
how a hypothesis was designed or constructed. Thus, unless and until a per-
suasive explanation or argument for why strong predictivism would be true is
presented, strong predictivism does not seem promising.6
Naturally, then, philosophers tend to advocate more modest theses regard-
ing the epistemic status of prediction versus accommodation. These theses
differ in important respects, but they share a common structure and have thus
jointly been labelled weak predictivism.7 Weak predictivism holds that the fact
that a hypothesis predicts rather than accommodates some data is, all other
things being equal, symptomatic of some other epistemic feature that speaks
in favor of the hypothesis. Thus weak predictivists hold that it is the likely
presence of this other epistemic feature that explains why the information that
6Leplin (1997) argues that prediction is superior to accommodation in virtue of the fact
that, in cases of prediction, the fit between data and theory cannot be explained without
positing that the theory is correct; in cases of accommodation, by contrast, the fit can be ex-
plained by citing the way in which the hypothesis was constructed. Therefore, argues Leplin,
predicted data allows us to infer the hypothesis via Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE),
whereas accommodated data does not. In my view, this argument is not persuasive because the
correctness of the hypothesis is not incompatible or even in tension with with its having been
constructed to fit the data. Put differently, these are not competing explanations (Lipton, 2004,
62-63). Thus, contra Leplin, the fact that the fit between an accommodating hypothesis and
the relevant data can be explained by the hypothesis having been constructed to fit the data
in no way prevents the correctness of the hypothesis from providing the ‘best’ explanation
among the relevant competing explanations (see Horwich 1982, 112-116; Lipton 2004, 168).
7I am roughly following the definition of ‘weak predictivism’ used by authors such as
White (2003), Hitchcock and Sober (2004), and Harker (2008). By contrast, Barnes (2009,
2018) prefers a more inclusive definition of ‘weak predictivism’ which includes the position,
advocated by Lipton (2004), that there is a mere correlation between prediction and (stronger)
confirmation. Barnes refers to this latter type of position as ‘thin predictivism’, and uses ‘tem-
pered predictivism’ to refer to what other authors (including myself) call weak predictivism.
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the hypothesis predicted the data often confirms the hypothesis more strongly
than the information that the hypothesis accommodated the data.8
Different versions of weak predictivism then differ in what they identify
as the relevant epistemic feature of which prediction is taken to be symp-
tomatic.9 For example, Maher (1988, 1990, 1993) argues that the information
that a hypothesis predicted rather than accommodated data indicates (ceteris
paribus) that the hypothesis was constructed by a more reliable method, i.e.
by a method is more likely to generate correct hypotheses, which in turn in-
creases the probability of the hypothesis. Lange (2001), by contrast, suggests
that predicting hypotheses are less likely to consist of arbitrary conjunctions
as compared to accommodating hypotheses, and so that predicting hypothe-
ses are superior (ceteris paribus) in virtue of being sufficiently unified so as to
be capable of being confirmed by past successes. For both Maher and Lange
— and indeed for any weak predictivist — there is thus an epistemic feature
of hypotheses for which prediction serves as a reliable proxy, all other things
being equal.10
An attentive reader may have noticed that I have described weak predic-
8As an anonymous reviewer points out, a theory evaluator might not know whether the
data was accommodated rather than predicted in a given case. In such a case, the theory
evaluator would have no grounds for placing more or less confidence in the hypothesis based
on the likely presence of the relevant epistemic feature. This shows that, according to weak
predictivism, it is not really the fact that the hypothesis predicted rather than accommodated
the data that confers an epistemic advantage on a hypothesis; rather, it is the receipt of this
information by those evaluating the theory that confers the advantage. Of course, this opens up
the possibility that theory evaluators might receive mistaken, or even intentionally deceitful,
information about whether some data was predicted or accommodated. For the purposes of
this paper, however, I will set this complication aside in order to focus on what epistemic
advantages there are to accommodation versus prediction when, and to the extent that, theory
evaluators do indeed know whether the data was predicted or accommodated.
9Different versions of weak predictivism could also conceivably differ in how strongly they
take prediction to be symptomatic for the epistemic feature in question (although this will
also presumably depend on the case at hand).
10In what follows, I will use Maher’s and Lange’s views as examples of weak predictivism for
the purposes of concretely illustrating how the argument below interacts with various forms
of weak predictivism. However, there are of course many other versions of weak predictivism
in the philosophical literature (let alone in logical space). For example, Hitchcock and Sober
(2004) argue for a version of weak predictivism according to which accommodating hypothe-
ses typically run a greater risk of having been overfitted, which in turn undermines their ac-
curacy in future predictions.
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tivists as claiming that prediction is symptomatic of some other epistemic fea-
ture of hypotheses all other things being equal (or, equivalently, ceteris paribus).
This qualifier is needed because any reasonable weak predictivism will have
to acknowledge that the link between prediction and the relevant epistemic
feature is defeasible. Consider, for instance, Maher’s weak predictivism: Sup-
pose we knew beforehand that the method by which a hypothesis was con-
structed was not at all reliable, e.g. that the hypothesis had been generated
from a completely random process. Then the information that the hypothesis
predicted rather than accommodated some data clearly does not indicate that
the hypothesis was constructed by a reliable method. In that case, even by
Maher’s lights, the information that the data was predicted by the hypothesis
doesn’t tell us anything about whether the hypothesis is likely to be correct.
So in that specific type of case, prediction would not be superior to accommo-
dation on Maher’s view. An analogous point holds for Lange’s weak predic-
tivism: If we knew already that a hypothesis is a conjunction of utterly arbi-
trary claims, then the information that the hypothesis predicted rather than
accommodated the data cannot successfully indicate that it isn’t gerryman-
dered, and so shouldn’t boost our confidence in the predicting hypothesis.
It is presumably possible to provide more a informative version of any given
weak predictivism by replacing this rather vague qualifier (‘all other things
being equal’/‘ceteris paribus’) with a precise description of the conditions un-
der which prediction non-defeasibly indicates that the epistemic feature is in
place. Indeed, Maher (1988, 276-280) explicitly provides a list of 12 assump-
tions from which he derives the result that the information that the hypothesis
predicted the data increases the probability that the hypothesis construction
method was reliable. These assumptions can effectively be viewed as speci-
fying the conditions under which Maher’s thesis holds unqualifiedly. Since
Lange does not derive his thesis from probabilistic assumptions, it is harder
to identify exactly what conditions would have to be in place for prediction to
non-defeasibly indicate that a hypothesis isn’t an arbitrary conjunction. Pre-
sumably, though, these conditions would rule out — perhaps among other
things — situations in which we already know whether, or the extent to which,
the hypothesis is a gerrymandered arbitrary conjunction. In general, I assume
it would be possible to formulate such specific conditions for any version of
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weak predictivism — effectively replacing the ceteris paribus-qualifier with a
more precise description of the range of cases in the thesis is meant to hold
unqualifiedly.
I have been dwelling on how to formulate more precise versions of weak
predictivism by replacing qualifiers with specific conditions because I shall
later suggest that these conditions interact with other conditions in ways that
illuminate the overall epistemic advantage of prediction versus accommoda-
tion. In the next two sections, I will be arguing that there are conditions under
which the information that a hypothesis accommodated rather than predicted
the data indicates that it has a specific epistemic feature. Now, it is perfectly
possible for both types of conditions to be satisfied simultaneously, in which
case there would be epistemic advantages to both predicting and accommo-
dating the data. To be sure, these epistemic advantages would be different for
accommodation and prediction respectively, since prediction and accommo-
dation would be indicative of different epistemic features of the hypothesis. It
is of course also possible for the conditions for a given weak predictivism to
be satisfied while the conditions for weak accommodationism aren’t, in which
case prediction would be overall epistemically advantageous. Finally, the con-
verse is also possible, i.e. that the conditions for ‘weak accommodationism’
are satisfied while the conditions for weak predictivism are not, in which case
accommodation would be overall epistemically advantageous (see section 5).
3 Anti-Fraud Accommodationism
As noted, I will be arguing that the information that a hypothesis accommo-
dated rather than predicted some data is indicative of a epistemic feature that
counts in favor of the hypothesis. I have referred to this as ‘weak accommo-
dationism’, since it is essentially the ‘converse’ of weak predictivism where
‘prediction’ and ‘accommodation’ have switched places.11 Now, the specific
11Some authors use the term ‘accommodationism’ for the denial of predictivism, i.e. for the
view that prediction is not superior to accommodation (Hitchcock and Sober, 2004; Douglas
and Magnus, 2013). I am using ‘weak accommodiationism’ in a quite different — and in
some respects stronger — sense, viz. for the view that there is an epistemic advantage to
accommodation over prediction.
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version of weak accommodationism for which I will be arguing holds that, ce-
teris paribus, the information that a hypothesis accommodated rather than pre-
dicted some data indicates that the data is more likely to be accurate, which
in turn increases the (posterior) probability of the hypothesis. The conditions
under which this holds are, roughly, conditions in which one isn’t already cer-
tain whether the data has been manipulated or fabricated to fit the hypothesis.
Since one could conceivably advocate weak accommodationism of a different
variety or for different reasons, I shall refer to this specific thesis as anti-fraud
accommodationism.
My argument for anti-fraud accommodationism proceeds straightforwardly
in two distinct steps, corresponding to the structure of the thesis itself. The
first step establishes that the information that a hypothesis H accommodated
rather than predicted some data D does indeed indicate (ceteris paribus) that D
is more likely to be accurate. The second step aims to establishes that D being
more likely to be accurate increases the probability that H is correct. Let me
emphasize that these steps are distinct: the first concerns the connection be-
tween a hypothesis being accommodated and the probability of the data; the
second concerns how this raises the probability of the hypothesis. In this sec-
tion, I lay out this argument in an informal manner; in the following section
I formalize the argument within a Bayesian framework, appealing specifically
to the generalization of Bayesian Conditionalization known as Jeffrey Condi-
tionalization. I thus ask formally-inclined readers to bear with me for the time
being and interpret the somewhat colloquial argument in this section in light
of its later, more precise, formulation.
Although philosophers of science often write as if data can be assumed to
be certain and indubitable — the absolute ‘given’ of scientific reasoning — it
should be clear that this is at best a useful idealization. In reality, the data
that scientists report may be inaccurate due to a variety of reasons, including
honest errors, incompetence, and intentional deception. For a given reported
data set, one might of course be more and less optimistic that it is accurate
— depending, presumably, on the identity of the scientists, their track record,
and the nature of the data. And there is certainly room for reasonable dis-
agreement about how common inaccurate data reporting is in general, and
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thus how far from the truth is the idealization that data is certain and indu-
bitable. Be that as it may, it would certainly be a mistake of rationality to be
absolutely certain of reported data, since that effectively amounts to ruling out
beforehand the very possibility that the data is inaccurate for some reason.12
The type of inaccurate data that will concern us here is that which is due to
deceptive reporting, i.e. to data fraud. In particular, two kinds of data fraud
will be relevant to the argument below. In data fabrication, the relevant data
is entirely invented or made up so as to appear to confirm some theory or hy-
pothesis. In one particularly high-profile case of data fabrication, physicist
Jan Hendrik Schön was found in 2002 to have manufactured data of several
reported semiconductor experiments that never took place. Having published
his ‘results’ in various leading journals in his field, Schön’s fabrications were
discovered only because he made the mistake of constructing data sets with
identical ‘noise’, i.e. minor disturbances in some of the electrical signals that
were supposedly being measured. Another type of data fraud, data manipula-
tion, is when data that has actually been obtained is distorted so as to appear
to confirm the relevant hypothesis — either by changing the values of mea-
surements or (more commonly) by excluding measurements that do not fit the
hypothesis.13 One egregious example of data manipulation is Andrew Wake-
field’s fraudulent study on MMR-vaccination and autism, in which adminis-
trating the vaccine was claimed to cause autism in young children. Wakefield
was found to have excluded data that didn’t fit his hypothesis and to have al-
tered other data, e.g. by claiming that eight of the 12 children investigated had
experienced symptoms of autism within three days of the vaccination, when
in fact only one child experienced such symptoms.
Cutting across the distinction between fabrication and manipulation is the
12This point can also be motivated by appealing to the widely accepted thesis of fallibilism,
i.e. the thesis that one should not be certain of any contingent proposition. In the Bayesian
framework, the corresponding condition of regularity requires that rational agents assign only
non-extreme probabilities (strictly between 0 and 1) to contingent propositions.
13This is commonly referred to as ‘falsification’ in the literature on, and guidelines for, sci-
entific misconduct. I have chosen the term ‘manipulation’ because ‘falsification’ carries un-
wanted connotations in philosophy of science (cf. Popper, 1959).
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distinction between intentional and unintentional data fraud.14 In the cases
mentioned so far, the researchers appear to have reported data that they knew
to be inaccurate so as to fit their favored hypotheses. However, there are
also well-known cases of inadvertent data fraud, i.e. cases in which scien-
tists have deceived themselves into ‘observing’ non-existent phenomena or re-
sults (Broad and Wade, 1982, 107-126). A particularly striking example is the
French physicist René Blondlot’s theory of ‘N-rays’, which Blondlot claimed
were a type of radiation analogous to X-rays (Nye, 1980). In 1903, Blondlot
claimed to have discovered the presence of N-rays through observing electric
sparks jumping between two wires that were (allegedly) slightly brighter than
one should otherwise been expected. Blondlot’s ‘discovery’ was widely cele-
brated among other French scientists and earned him the prestigious Leconte
Prize in 1904. Over 40 French scientists subsequently reported that they had
‘reproduced’ Blondlot’s observations, claiming to have also seen the increased
brightness reported by Blondlot. Although these scientists couldn’t actually
have observed this non-existent effect, there is reason to believe that Blond-
lot himself, and at least some of his followers, did indeed believe themselves
to have seen it. If so, this is an example of unintentional data fraud, where
the researchers did not just deceive their intended audience but themselves as
well.15
Now consider what we learn about the likelihood of data fraud when we
learn that the relevant data D was either predicted or accommodated by the
hypothesis H . When a scientist has used H to predict D, the scientist could
have either fabricated or manipulated D so as to make it fit H . Indeed, in
many cases the predicting scientist has self-interested reasons to do exactly
that, for example because reporting on a prediction that is borne out is gen-
14Since I define data fraud as the deceptive reporting of inaccurate data, this implies that it
is possible to unintentionally deceive someone, e.g. in cases where one sincerely communicates
a false belief to another person (Adler, 1997). Nothing of substance hangs on this, however. If
you think unintentional deception is a conceptual impossibility, you may use the term ‘mis-
lead’ for what I am calling deception (as is suggested by Carson, 2010, 47), and replace ‘de-
ceptive’ with ‘deceptive or misleading’ in my definition of data fraud.
15Presumably, Blondlot’s followers were unwittingly affected by the psychological phe-
nomenon known as expectancy bias, where our expectations shape what we take ourselves to
perceive (Rosenthal, 1963).
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erally considered a much more significant result than a failed prediction,16 or
because the scientists has some scientific, financial, or otherwise personal, in-
terest in confirming the hypothesis in question. Returning to our three exam-
ples, Schön appears to have fabricated data in order to obtain ‘results’ that fit
with accepted scientific theories on semiconductors and would be publishable
in the leading journals in his field; Wakefield had personal and financial ties
to private companies that benefitted directly from casting doubt on the safety
of traditional MMR-vaccines; and French scientists considered Blondlot’s ‘dis-
covery’ of N-rays to be a great triumph of a French scientific community whose
reputation was on the decline. In all these cases, the reported data was made
to fit pre-conceived hypotheses from which predictions had been derived.
In cases of accommodation, by contrast, there is no operative hypothesis H
such that the accommodating scientist could have fabricated or manipulated
D in order to fit H . Thus the scientist could not have the type of self-interested
reason they have in cases of prediction to manipulate or fabricate D to fit H .
This is not to say that it is impossible for a piece of accommodated data to be
fraudulent, since a scientist might fabricate or manipulate data for some other
reason, e.g. as a form of self-destructive behavior, regardless of whether the
data was predicted or accommodated. Moreover, even non-fraudulent data
might be inaccurate for various reasons, e.g. because of honest errors in how
the data was obtained and registered. So the claim here is not that accom-
modated data carries no risk of being fraudulent or inaccurate. Rather, the
point is that in cases of prediction there is an additional risk of the data being
fraudulent, and thus inaccurate, due to scientists’ own motivations for having
their predictions confirm the hypotheses that they have already formulated. A
scientist could not possibly have similar motivations for fabricating or manip-
ulating the data to fit the hypothesis in cases of accommodation, since there
would be no relevant hypothesis H that the scientist has some stakes in pro-
moting. Indeed, since the hypothesis in question has not yet been formulated
when the data is obtained in cases of accommodation, the accommodating sci-
entist can simply alter her hypothesis to fit whatever data she gathers, so the
16Often, nothing statistically significant can be concluded from a failed prediction, and
even when something can be concluded it is often much less interesting than the original
hypothesis.
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accommodating scientists who is seeking a fit between hypothesis and data
can always achieve that in a straightforward, non-fraudulent way.
The relevant upshot here is that data fraud — fabrication and manipulation
of data, be it intentional or unintentional — can safely be taken to be consider-
ably less common in cases of accommodation as compared to prediction. That
is not necessarily to say that data fraud is common even in cases of prediction;
only that it is much more common than in cases of accommodation. So, all
other things being equal, one should be less confident that predicted data is ac-
curate as compared to accommodated data. After all, the chances of predicted
data being manipulated or fabricated — and thus inaccurate — are consider-
ably higher than for accommodated data. This contrast in how confident one
should be about the data in cases of accommodation versus prediction is the
epistemic feature that I take accommodation to be an indication of or proxy
for. Note that this is not yet to say anything about how confident one should
be about the the hypothesis in cases of accommodation versus prediction. So it
remains to be argued that this epistemic feature of accommodation — that the
relevant data is more likely to be accurate in accommodation than in predic-
tion, ceteris paribus — makes it more likely that the hypothesis is correct.
That is where the next step of the argument comes in. Informally, this step
shows that, all other things being equal, the confidence assigned to a hypothe-
sis in light of some data should be greater to the extent that one assigns greater
confidence to the data itself being accurate, provided that the data would in-
deed confirm the hypothesis if it was accurate. A formal proof of this step
will be given shortly, but I’ll start by providing the following informal argu-
ment. Suppose that by your lights a hypothesis H would be confirmed by
some data D, so that if you discovered that D is accurate you would increase
your confidence in H . Now suppose that instead of learning that D is defi-
nitely accurate, you learn that D is to a certain extent likelier to be accurate
than you previous thought. Then your confidence in H should be somewhere
strictly between what it would be if D was and wasn’t definitely discovered to
be accurate, since the possibility that D isn’t accurate means your confidence
should be lower than it would be if you definitely learned that D is accurate
while the possibility that D is accurate means it should be higher than what
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it would be if you definitely learned that D isn’t accurate. Similarly, if you
learned that D is even more likely to be accurate (as compared to the previous
case), then your confidence in H should be somewhere strictly between what
it should have been in the previous case and what it would have been if you
definitely learned that D is accurate. By the same token, if you learned that
D is less likely to obtain (as compared to the first case), then your confidence
in H should be somewhere strictly between what it should have been in the
first case and what it would have been if you didn’t learn anything about D.
And so forth. The upshot, of course, is that your confidence in H should be
proportional to how much you increase your confidence in D in light of what
you learn.
With this informal version of the second step in place, I can now summarize
the argument for what I am calling anti-fraud accommodationism. In the first
step, I argued that because scientists have no reason to commit data fraud in
cases of accommodation, whereas they unfortunately do have self-interested
reasons to do so in cases of prediction (and have been known to do so in such
cases), we should place less confidence in the accuracy of predicted data as
compared to accommodated data, all other things being equal. In the second
step, I then argued that this difference in how much confidence we should
place in the data translates into a difference in how confident we should be
about the hypothesis that the data is meant to support. From this we can
conclude that, all other things being equal, the information that a hypothesis
accommodates rather than predicts some data does serves as an indication of
an epistemic feature, viz. the likelihood that the data is accurate, that counts
in favor of the hypothesis. Since that is what anti-fraud accommodationism
asserts, this concludes my (informal) argument.
4 Derivation with Jeffrey Conditionalization
In order to formalize this argument, we must appeal to some formal frame-
work for inductive reasoning. The dominant one is Bayesianism, a standard
version of which can be viewed as the conjunction of the following three the-
ses: First, perfectly rational agents can be represented as having fine-grained
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opinions known as credences. Second, the credences of such perfectly ratio-
nal agents satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms of probability, which means that the
credences they have at a given time can be represented as (subjective) proba-
bilities. Third, perfectly rational agents are required to update their credences
as they obtain new data in accordance with Bayesian Conditionalization, which
holds that when you obtain some data, you should set your new credence in
any hypothesis equal to your previous credence in that hypothesis conditional
on the data.17 Formally:
Bayesian Conditionalization: When you obtain some data D, your new
(subjective) probability for any hypothesis H , Pn(H), should equal your old
probability for H given D, Po(H |D):
Pn(H) = Po(H |D)
Although Bayesian Conditionalization is a powerful tool, there is an impor-
tant limitation to this rule that turns out to be crucial to my argument in this
paper. What if you do not simply ‘obtain’ or ‘learn’ the data D in the intended
unqualified sense, but instead merely become more (or less) confident that D
holds? Richard Jeffrey (1965) proposed a generalization of Bayesian Condi-
tionalization that handles cases of this sort, a simple version of which can be
17Note that none of the three theses that jointly constitute this version of Bayesianism say
anything about which credences agents should start out with beyond the requirement that
these initial credences should satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms. Unfortunately, many sets of
initial credences that we would intuitively think of as outrageous satisfy these axioms; and if
we do start out with outrageous credences we might very well also end up with outrageous
credences once we update them in accordance with Bayesian Conditionalization (although
convergence theorems ameliorate this problem in many cases). Indeed, for this reason, many
its proponents hold that Bayesanism is merely a bare-bones framework for non-deductive
reasoning that will need to be supplemented with substantive assumptions about acceptable
probability functions (see, e.g., Howson, 2000; Strevens, 2004). Nothing in what I say below
solves or ameliorates this problem; accordingly, I will not assume that probability functions
must meet any general constraints beyond the Kolmogorov axioms.
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stated as follows (Jeffrey, 1965, 169):18
Jeffrey Conditionalization: When your (subjective) probability for some
data D changes in any way, your new probability for any hypothesis H ,
Pn(H), should equal a weighing of your old conditional probabilities Po(H |D)
and Po(H |¬D) by your new probabilities for the data, Pn(D) and Pn(¬D):
Pn(H) = Po(H |D)Pn(D) + Po(H |¬D)Pn(¬D)
The idea here is that when there is uncertainty about the data D, one should
conditionalize on D to the extent that one has credence in D and on ¬D to the
extent that one has credence in ¬D.19
Since Jeffrey Conditionalization can handle cases in which the data is un-
certain, it is arguably superior to Bayesian Conditionalization as a general rule
for evidential updating.20 After all, as we have seen, one should never treat
data as absolutely certain. Indeed, the need to use Jeffrey Conditionalization
rather than good-old Bayesian Conditionalization is especially apparent when
we contrast accommodation and prediction, since predicted data should (ce-
teris paribus) be treated as more uncertain than accommodated data, due to the
fact that scientists have no self-interested reasons to manipulate or fabricate
accommodated data whereas they unfortunately often do have such reasons in
18What follows is a special case in which the change in one’s credences prompted by the
learning experience is limited to the partition {D,¬D}. In the more general case where the
learning experience changes one’s credences on the partition {D1, ...,Dn}, Jeffrey Conditional-





For n = 2, this reduces to the simplified version of Jeffrey Conditionalization in the main text.
19Note that this collapses into Bayesian Conditionalization whenever one becomes certain
about the data, since in that case Pn(D) = 1 and Pn(¬D) = 0, so the right hand side becomes
Po(H |D)× 1 + Po(H |¬D)× 0 = Po(H |D).
20A well-known criticism of Jeffrey Conditionalization is that after repeatedly updating by
this rule one might end up in different epistemic states, depending on the order in which one
updates on different pieces of evidence (Levi, 1967). However, Lange (2000) argues that this
feature of Jeffrey Conditionalization is a virtue rather than a vice since the character of the
evidence will itself depend on the order of updating.
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the case of predicted data. So if we wish to analyze the epistemic significance
of accommodation versus prediction, we should clearly prefer Jeffrey Condi-
tionalization, where differences in the certainty of data can be represented,
to Bayesian Conditionalization, where such differences have been idealized
away. The question, then, is how a rational agent using Jeffrey Conditionaliza-
tion should update her credences in cases of accommodation versus cases of
prediction.
To start, recall that I am seeking to show that accommodation has one im-
portant epistemic advantage over prediction, not that accommodation is over-
all more epistemically advantageous than prediction. Indeed, as I will em-
phasize in the next section, I am happy to acknowledge that prediction often
has epistemic advantages over accommodation, e.g. along the lines suggested
by Maher (1988) and Lange (2001). But in order to isolate the specific fea-
ture of accommodation that interests me here, I must start by comparing cases
of prediction and accommodation in which these advantages to prediction —
whatever they may be — are not present.21 (Recall that proponents of weak
predictivism acknowledge that there are such cases, since they concede that
prediction is only superior to accommodation when all other things are equal.)
Of course, I will not assume that accommodation has any advantages over pre-
diction either, beyond the difference in how probable the data should be taken
to be in each type of case. Rather, I will simply restrict the argument to cases
in which prediction and accommodation are on a par with regard to how much
confirmation is conferred on a hypothesis H by predicted data, DP versus ac-
commodated data, DA; and likewise for their respective negations ¬DP and
¬DA. Formally:
Po(H |DA) = Po(H |DP )
Po(H |¬DA) = Po(H |¬DP )
(1)
I will also restrict the argument to cases in which the hypothesis would be
21If this sounds suspicious, compare this approach to how physicists commonly set the ef-
fects of various forces to zero in order to isolate the effects of other forces, as when objects are
assumed to move on frictionless planes when studying the effects of collisions between such
objects.
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confirmed by the data to some extent, i.e. in which the subjective probability
of the hypothesis is higher conditional on the data than on the data’s negation.
This is just to say that the data, if it were discovered to be accurate, would
have some positive epistemic relevance to the hypothesis. To deny this is to
say that the data would either be completely irrelevant to the hypothesis, or
else disconfirm that hypothesis. Since that is not the sort of case in which the
data can be said to ‘fit’ the hypothesis, I take this condition to follow from the
definitions of ‘prediction’ and ‘accommodation’. Formally:
Po(H |DA) > Po(H |¬DA)
Po(H |DP ) > Po(H |¬DP )
(2)
Finally and most significantly, we represent the fact that one should be less
certain about the accuracy of predicted data as compared to accommodated
data by an inequality in the (posterior) probabilities assigned to each type of
data after obtaining it:22
P An (DA) > P
P
n (DP ) (3)
In support of this condition, I have argued in the previous section that scien-
tists cannot be motivated to manipulate or fabricate data to fit their preferred
hypothesis in cases of accommodation, whereas that is unfortunately not so
in cases of prediction. Of course, it is still possible that a piece of accommo-
dated data is inaccurate, e.g. due to honest errors or incompetence. But that is
equally true of predicted data. The difference is that in the case of predicted
data, there is an additional risk of the data being inaccurate due to scientists’
own interest in having their predictions confirm the hypotheses they or their
colleagues have already formulated. It is this contrast between accommoda-
tion and prediction that justifies the third and final condition (although as I
discuss below, I do acknowledge that (3) isn’t satisfied in certain non-typical
cases).
With conditions (1)-(3) in place, a straightforward derivation using Jeffrey
Conditionalization can now be given for assigning a higher subjective proba-
22Here, and in what follows, P An (·) and P Pn (·) denote the the posterior probability functions
in instances of accommodations and prediction, respectively.
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bility to H in the case of accommodation as compared to prediction:
P An (H) > P
P
n (H)
A formal proof of this entailment is mathematically straightforward and pro-
vided in the Appendix. It should also be easy to see how the proof proceeds at
an intuitive level: By Jeffrey Conditionalization, one should roughly speaking
update by conditionalizing (i) on D to an extent that matches one’s current
credence in D, and (ii) on ¬D to an extent that matches one’s current credence
in ¬D. Given (3), one’s current credence in D should be higher in cases of
accommodation than in cases of prediction, so one should conditionalize to a
greater extent on D (and to a lesser extent on ¬D) in cases of accommodation
than in cases of prediction. By (2), conditionalizing on D raises the probability
of H more than conditionalizing on ¬D, so — given that all other things are
equal, as per condition (1) — it follows that updating by Jeffrey Condition-
alization in cases of accommodation raises the probability of H more than it
does in otherwise identical cases of prediction.
5 Discussion and Loose Ends
I have argued that, ceteris paribus, the information that a hypothesis accom-
modates rather than predicts some data confers a specific epistemic advantage
on the hypothesis in virtue of increasing our rational confidence in the data
itself. In this penultimate section, I address two important questions about
this thesis: First, how commonly, and under what conditions, is the ceteris
paribus-clause satisfied in such a way that accommodation in fact confers this
epistemic advantage on a given hypothesis? Second, assuming that anti-fraud
accommodationism and some version of weak predictivism are both true, how
(if at all) can one tell, in a given case, whether prediction or accommodation is
more epistemically advantageous all things considered?
The key to answering the first question is condition (3), according to which
accommodated data should be assigned a higher (posterior) probability than
predicted data. The justification for this condition was that scientists have
self-interested reasons to manipulate or fabricate predicted data, whereas the
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same isn’t true for accommodated data. While I have argued that this is typ-
ically the case, there are also cases in which this consideration is defeated. If
you already knew for certain whether the data was manipulated or fabricated,
then information which bears on whether the relevant scientists had reasons to
manipulate or fabricate the data shouldn’t effect your rational confidence that
it was. Consider, in particular, the special case in which you gathered the rel-
evant data yourself. In that case, you can presumably be more-or-less certain
that the data wasn’t (or was!) manipulated or fabricated, so it would make
practically no difference to the probability of the data whether you predicted
or accommodated it.23 Accordingly, the epistemic advantage of accommoda-
tion over prediction to which anti-fraud accommodationism appeals would
not be present in cases of this sort.24
On the other hand, whenever one isn’t already rationally certain whether
the data was manipulated or fabricated, then the conditions for there being
an epistemic advantage to accommodation over prediction would be satisfied.
I think it’s fair to say that these conditions will typically be satisfied, since it
is really only in the special case in which you gathered the data yourself that
it would plausibly be rational to be close to absolutely certain that the data
hasn’t been manipulated or fabricated. According to a recent meta-analysis
of various previous surveys on research misconduct, 2% of scientists admit
to “fabricating, falsifying or modifying data”, and 14% claim to have knowl-
edge of it by their colleagues (Fanelli, 2009). Since these surveys rely on self-
reporting of misconduct and knowledge thereof, there is reason to think they
underestimate the true extent of data fraud. In any case, these numbers are
23Strictly speaking, a perfectly rational Bayesian agent would not assign probability 1 to the
data even in that case, since doing so precludes the very possibility of being wrong about this
contingent proposition. It is conceivable, after all, that you are misremembering whether you
fabricated/manipulated the data. But in cases of this sort, the rationally assigned probability
can be taken to be so close to 1 that the epistemic advantage of accommodation would be
negligible for most practical purposes.
24Another type of case in which it might be prudent to regard data as almost certainly ac-
curate is when one knows that the data could very easily be checked by other researchers. In
such cases, it would be comparatively foolish for scientists to attempt to ‘get away with’ pub-
lishing fraudulent data. Interestingly, although these types of situations may have been some-
what common in the earliest stages of empirical science, such cases are arguably becoming in-
creasingly rare.
21
high enough that it would certainly be a mistake to exclude beforehand the
possibility that the predicting scientist has manipulated or fabricated the data
they report (except perhaps when that scientist is you). Hence it is fair to say
that there is typically an epistemic advantage to accommodation over predic-
tion.
Indeed, there is reason to think that scientists are themselves conscious of
the possibility that an apparently successful prediction is based on data fraud.
Consider, for instance, the controversy over Gregor Mendel’s (1866) work on
inheritance, in which Mendel proposed and argued for his laws of segrega-
tion and independent assortment (Franklin, 2008). The controversy concerns
whether the observations reported by Mendel are ‘too close’ to the frequen-
cies one would expect from the laws he proposed. For example, Mendel’s laws
predicted that certain mutually exclusive phenotypes in peas, e.g. being green
versus yellow, would occur with probability ratios of 3:1 in a second genera-
tion of breeding. In other words, each pea would be three times more likely
to be yellow than green. This would lead us to expect that the observed fre-
quency of dominant to recessive phenotypes will lie somewhere reasonably
close to a 3:1 ratio. In fact, Mendel reported an observed frequency of almost
exactly that ratio, viz. 3.01:1 (Mendel, 1866, 12).
The fact that the observations Mendel reported fit his theories’ predictions
so remarkably well aroused skepticism from W.F.R. Weldon, who became con-
vinced that Mendel had manipulated his data (even while acknowledging that
Mendel’s theories were both important and substantially correct). Another
eminent statistician, R.A. Fisher (1936), performed a detailed statistical anal-
ysis of Mendel’s data and concluded that it provides evidence that “the data
of most, if not all, of the experiments have been falsified so as to agree closely
with Mendel’s expectations” (Fisher, 1936, 132).25 Whether or not Weldon’s
and Fisher’s accusations are in fact accurate, they show clearly that scientists
themselves at least sometimes consider data fraud to be a live possibility in
25However, Fisher found it implausible that Mendel had committed fraud himself, so Fisher
speculated that the data had been falsified by an assistant (Fisher, 1936, 132).
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cases of prediction.26
The second question I promised to address in this section concerns what the
epistemic advantage to accommodation over prediction entails about whether
prediction or accommodation is more epistemically advantageous all things
considered. Suppose — as I believe is plausible — that some version of weak
predictivism is true.27 Then there are some ceteris paribus-conditions un-
der which the information that the data was predicted rather than accommo-
dated confers an epistemic advantage on the corresponding hypothesis. Re-
call, for example, that in Maher’s version of weak predictivism, these condi-
tions specify that one isn’t already certain whether the method of hypothesis-
construction was reliable. Call any such condition CP .28 And call the corre-
sponding condition for anti-fraud accommodationism CA. In order to answer
the question of whether accommodation or prediction is more epistemically
advantageous overall in a given case, we consider which of these conditions
are satisfied:
1. If neither CP nor CA is satisfied, there is no epistemic advantage to either
prediction or accommodation, so neither is more epistemically advanta-
geous overall.
2. If CP is satisfied but CA isn’t, there is some epistemic advantage to pre-
diction but no advantage to accommodation, so prediction is more epis-
temically advantageous overall.
3. If CP isn’t satisfied but CA is, there is no epistemic advantage to predic-
tion but some advantage to accommodation, so accommodation is more
epistemically advantageous overall.
26Note also that they seem to have considered this to be a live possibility precisely because
Mendel’s laws predict the actual result that would be obtained. Had the data been gathered
independently of constructing the hypothesis, Weldon and Fisher would have had no reason
to be suspicious of the data.
27If no version of predictivism is true, then the answer to the second question would be
trivial given how we answered the first question: Accommodation would simply be more
epistemically advantageous than prediction whenever the condition outlined in the previous
paragraph is satisfied, and otherwise there would be no epistemic difference between the two.
28Or, if there are more than one such condition, let CP be the conjunction of these condi-
tions.
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4. If both CP and CA are satisfied, there are (different) epistemic advantages
to both prediction and accommodation, and no obvious way to tell which
(if either) type of epistemic advantage is stronger.
For our purposes, the most interesting set of cases are those in the third
category, where CA is satisfied but CP isn’t. Whenever one knows that one is
dealing with such a case, one should be more confident that the relevant hy-
pothesis is correct if one also knows that it was constructed to accommodate
the data than if one knows that the hypothesis was used to predict the data.
So in such cases the common thought that prediction is superior to accommo-
dation should not just be rejected but indeed reversed. Suppose for example
that Maher’s version of weak predictivism is correct (and that other versions of
weak predictivism are not). In that case, CP includes as a necessary condition
that one doesn’t already know for certain whether the method by which the
hypothesis was constructed was reliable. Thus, in any circumstances in which
one does know for certain whether the method by which the hypothesis was
constructed was reliable (so CP isn’t satisfied), but one doesn’t know for cer-
tain whether the data was manipulated or fabricated (so CA is satisfied), one
should prefer the hypothesis to have accommodated rather than predicted the
data. The point generalizes to any other version of weak predictivism: When-
ever the typicality conditions set forth by the weak predictivist aren’t satisfied,
but the corresponding typicality condition for anti-fraud accommodationism
is satisfied, accommodation is epistemically superior to prediction — not just
in one respect, but all things considered as well.
While cases in the third category are thus the most intriguing, cases in the
fourth category are the most complicated and difficult to generalize about. For
cases in this category, whether prediction or accommodation is overall more
epistemically advantageous depends partly on factors other than whether the
data was predicted or accommodated. Roughly, this is because whether the
epistemic advantage to accommodation outweighs the epistemic advantage(s)
to prediction in such cases depends on the extent to which a higher probabil-
29To explain, consider a comparison of the posterior probability of the hypothesis H after
updating on D in cases of accommodation versus cases of prediction:




ity of accommodated data raises the probability of the hypothesis, which in
turn depends on how well the data fits the hypothesis regardless of whether
it was accommodated or predicted.29 So the extent to which accommodation
provides an epistemic advantage over prediction, and thus whether that ad-
vantage is overall greater than that of prediction in a given case, depends on
factors that are independent of whether the hypothesis was predicted or ac-
commodated. In some cases, these factors will be such that having the hy-
pothesis predict the data will provide more support for the hypothesis; in
other cases, accommodated data will provide more support. Thus a further
analysis of this category would presumably have to proceed on a case-by-case
basis.
Since CP and CA are ceteris paribus-conditions for weak predictivism and
anti-fraud accommodationism respectively, most instances of empirical sup-
port will presumably fall under category four. In other words, there will nor-
mally be epistemic advantages to both prediction and accommodation with no
obvious way to tell which advantage is stronger. Although it might in princi-
ple be possible to estimate which type of advantage is stronger in a given case,
it would surely be unrealistic to expect working scientists to even come close
to performing such an analysis in practice. This may explain why working sci-
entists do not in fact seem to have preferred prediction over accommodation
Using Jeffrey Conditionalization, we can expand both sides as follows:
Po(H |DA)P An (DA) + Po(H |¬DA)P An (¬DA) Q Po(H |DP )P Pn (DP ) + Po(H |¬DP )P Pn (¬DP )
Now, in so far as there is an epistemic advantage to accommodation in cases that fall into the
fourth category above, this manifests itself in a higher value for P An (DA) than for P
P
n (DP ), and
in a lower value for P An (¬DA) than for P Pn (¬DP ). But the extent to which this affects the com-
parison between the left and right hand sides depends on the values of the terms to which
they are multiplied, i.e. Po(H |DA), Po(H |DP ), Po(H |¬DA), and Po(H |¬DP ), respectively. For ex-
ample, having P An (DA) be higher than P
P
n (DP ) makes a greater difference to a comparison be-
tween P An (H) and P
P
n (H) to the extent that the difference between Po(H |DA) and Po(H |¬DA) is
greater, since these terms are multiplied together on each side. But the difference between
Po(H |DA) and Po(H |¬DA) is clearly not solely determined by whether the data was accommo-
dated or predicted by H ; rather, it also depends on how likely the data is conditional on H
regardless of whether the data was predicted or accommodated, i.e. on how well H ‘fits’ D (e.g. in
terms of how many of the data points in a data set are explained by the hypothesis).
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in many historical cases (Brush, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994).30 That is, since any
epistemic advantage of prediction over accommodation identified by a given
weak predictivism might just as well be outweighed a contrary advantage of
accommodation over prediction identified by anti-fraud accommodationism,
prediction and accommodation might as well be treated as epistemically on
a par for most practical purposes. The exception to this rule would be cases
in which it is obvious to scientists themselves that one but not the other of CP
and CA is satisfied, in which case one would expect scientists to prefer the type
of support for which the corresponding condition is satisfied.31
6 Conclusion
I have argued that there is a respect in which accommodation is typically
epistemically superior to prediction. The information that some data was ac-
commodated rather than predicted by a hypothesis typically indicates (ceteris
paribus) that the data is more likely to be accurate, which in turn increases
the probability of the hypothesis by Jeffrey Conditionalization. This is not to
deny that there may well be other respects in which prediction is epistemically
superior to accommodation. If so, there is no general answer as to which type
of empirical support, accommodation or prediction, is epistemically superior
all things considered. While it is possible to identify a category of cases in
which prediction is always superior all things considered, it is also possible
to identify a category in which the reverse is true. Moreover, the largest cate-
gory of cases is arguably one in which there are advantages to both prediction
and accommodation, and in which there is no obvious way to tell which type
of advantage happens to be stronger. This goes against the long and venera-
ble tradition in philosophy of science of emphasizing the epistemic potency of
prediction as against accommodation.
30Interestingly, Brush does find a preference for predicting theories in one case, viz.
Mendeleev’s periodic table of elements (Brush, 1996). However, Scerri and Worrall dispute
even that historical claim (Scerri and Worrall, 2001; Worrall, 2005; Scerri, 2005); see also
Brush (2007) and Barnes (2005a, 2009, ch. 3) for replies to Scerri and Worrall.
31I hope to address the empirical question of whether this expectation is borne out in future
work in which working scientists would be queried as to whether prediction or accommoda-
tion provides stronger support in different types of cases across categories one through four.
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In closing, I would like to emphasize the potential social implications of
these considerations. If my argument is sound, it may be misguided for those
who engage with the public about scientific matters to focus exclusively on the
predictive support for various scientific theories. Consider, for example, the
case of climate science. When the support for anthropogenic climate change
is communicated to the public, a great deal of emphasis is often placed on the
extent to which climate models with anthropogenic forcings have been predic-
tively successful. There is nothing wrong with pointing to successful predic-
tions, of course, and any sound communication strategy ought to include it.
However, a more complete strategy might also emphasize the extent to which
these models accommodated data that had been collected previously. After
all, support through accommodation cannot plausibly be dismissed as based
on fabricated or manipulated data, so even the most ardent climate change
deniers cannot reasonably dismiss accommodated data as fraudulent. This
suggests that a mixed approach, in which the theory’s predictive and accom-
modative successes are communicated simultaneously, may help to convince
some of those who would otherwise remain skeptical.32
Appendix: Proof of Theorem
Theorem. (1), (2), and (3) jointly entail
P An (H) > P
P
n (H).
Proof. First we multiply both sides of (3) with the term (Po(H |DA)−Po(H |¬DA)),
which is non-negative according to (2):
P An (DA)
(
Po(H |DA)− Po(H |¬DA)
)
> P Pn (DP )
(
Po(H |DA)− Po(H |¬DA)
)
32I am grateful for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Chris Dorst,
Marc Lange, three anonymous reviewers for Philosophers’ Imprint, and audiences at the Uni-
versity of Iceland and the University of Oslo.
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We then add the term Po(H |¬DA) to both sides:
Po(H |¬DA) + P An (DA)
(
Po(H |DA)− Po(H |¬DA)
)
> Po(H |¬DA) + P Pn (DP )
(
Po(H |DA)− Po(H |¬DA)
)
Algebraic manipulations, omitted here for the sake of brevity, reveal that this
is equivalent to:
Po(H |DA)P An (DA) + Po(H |¬DA)(1− P An (DA))
> Po(H |DA)P Pn (DP ) + Po(H |¬DA)(1− P Pn (DP ))
Since (1− P An (DA)) = P An (¬DA) and (1− P Pn (DP )) = P Pn (¬DP ), this simplifies to:
Po(H |DA)P An (DA) + Po(H |¬DA)P An (¬DA) > Po(H |DA)P Pn (DP ) + Po(H |¬DA)P Pn (¬DP )
By (1), we can substitute Po(H |DA) for Po(H |DP ), and similarly Po(H |¬DA) for
Po(H |¬DP ), on the right hand side. This gets us:
Po(H |DA)P An (DA)+Po(H |¬DA)P An (¬DA) > Po(H |DP )P Pn (DP )+Po(H |¬DP )P Pn (¬DP )
By Jeffrey Conditionalization, this is equivalent to P An (H) > P Pn (H), as desired.
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